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.1~i~~:(::1~..[\I'I' NI 1~N1.t .~hiT rUIN: C I~• CTOII lIEU/UI t)fl%.IIh.'~'~~'~4 volatile since 1980. Chart t shows output and employniient in the manufacturing sector, Output is gross domestic product originating in manufacturing It 982 lir'i~es1or reai valtie-added in that sectoi ', From 1947 ', From to 1979 uning output grew at a 3 ti percent rate, hut em planter tt rose ii inch 1110 res I uwl~' , averagir ig a 0.9 pen-cent rate of growth over the period. Since then, there have been periods of declining output It/I 980 to Itt/I 980 and 111/1981 to tV/I 9821, relatively slow growth lilt/I 984 to IV/ 19851 antI rapid advance I IV/1982 to 111/ 19841. in the recent per'iod of slow growth. nianufacturing ou [put exp~tndlml at only a 1 .5~ie cent rate, while employment fell by 131, 60 (1 per~ohs, a t).5 percent rate of decline.
The periods of declining, n'elatively slow and fast growth of manufacturing in the 1980s closely follow cyclical niovements iii dontestic neal income. As chart 2 shows, dlUring the shaded recession periods real icome IGNPI declines, but manufacturing output .1 falls even more; dltrning periods when real GNP grows relatively rapidly, mantrfactttring otttpnt gn'oWth tends to be stronger'.
Millions of persons
'there are two pr-incipal explanations for' the cs'clical sensitivity of manufacturing output. The Iirst, called the ''per-manent income'' hypothesis, emphasizes that when r-eal income is temporan-ilv depressed. ptir'-chases of durable manufactured goods tend to be postponed; when real iricortie is temporarily highen'. most of the income gain is saved for future consurnption, including saving in the form of durable goods acquisition: lie second explanation emphasizes the 1-esponsi\.'eness of supply to price changes. Variations in demand, including those due to cyclical real inrome changes, have little effect on the prices of goods whose supply is \'er'\' responsive to price. The supply 3 See Milton Friedman (1957) . The pioneering application of this concept to the demand for durable goods is developed by Harberger (1960) and the studies therein, of other goods is r-elatively tess responsive to price var-iation, and these goods show gr-eater price yar-iahllity when teat itironie fluctuates. 'the manufactum-ing sector is usually characterized as having t-elativelv less flexible prices so that variations itt demand affect output n'elatively mo re and price r-etativeiy tess, than in other sector's of the economy. 4
The experience of the 1980s appear-s to tie consistent with the previous cyclical experience. The recent intervals of stow or negative gr-owth appear' to be due to cyclical niovernents in real iticome. But the cyclical volatility in chan-t 1 may be obscuring a general tendency Ion' manufacturing output growth to have been depressed liv the rise in the value of the dollar. 'Okun (1981) develops aggregate theories of price adjustment and cyclical behavior based on the distinction between what he called "flex-price" and "tixed-price" industries. The elasticity of supply in a competitive industry plays only a minor role in this work, Other factors, such as the objectives of firms and degrees of competitiveness, play more important roles in Okun's analysis. An appreciation in the value of the dollar is frequently blamed for' recent weakness in the growth of U.S. manufacturing output. When the price of the dollar in units of foreign cun'r-ency n-ises, the prices of U.S. goods measun'ed in fot-eign currencies also increase, given the dollar prices of those goods. On the other hand, foreign currencies become cheaper, making the dollar' prices of foreign goods tower. As a result. both foreigners arid domestic residents buy fewer' 1,1_S. goods and more fot-eign goods. From the U.S. point of view, exports fall, while impor-ts of foreign goods increase.
As chart 3 shows, the marked appreciation in the value of the dollar began in tate 1980 and continued until the fir-st quarter of 1985. Over the period, the exchange n-ate rose fairly steadily at a 14.4 percent annual rate. Over-the remaining three quarter-s of 1985. the value of the dollar fell at a 26 percent rate, reaching an end-of-year' value near' its early 1983 level. The earlier rise in the dollar's value has been held responsible for the dismal per-for-nuance in manufacturing, and the same view suggests that the recent depi-eciation will lead to renewed strength.5 1n principle, the appropriate measure of the exchange value of the dollar is the "real" exchange rate, which takes into account changes in U.S. and foreign prices. For example, the real exchange rate rose at a 13.2 percent rate over the period 11/1980 to 1/1985. The difference between the growth rates of the nominal and real exchange rate reflects an average annual rate of price increase abroad that was about 1.1 percent per year higher than in the United States, For empirical purposes, there is little difference between the two series. From 1/1970 to 111/1985, a regression of the growth in the real exchange rate on a constant and the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate, with significant autocorrelation correction, accounts for 97 percent of the variation in the real exchange rate. Of course, the coefficient on the nominal exchange rate is not significantly different from one.
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Index, March 1973t100  160   1970 11  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84 While manufacturing output gr-owth has had periods ofweakness in the 1980s, it has not been uniformly slow. Front 111/1980 to 1/1985, the period of strong appreciation, manufacturing output rose at a 4 percent n-ate. Such gr-owth is han-dly weak compared with the ear'lier recon'd for such grxiwth. More important, to the extent that the dollar appreciation explains the 1984-85 weakness in manufacturing, the effect was mysteriously late.
As chart 4 shows, the shan-e of manufactured output in n-cal (iNP since 1948 is strongly cyclical. Fnoni 1980 'Jonas (1986) discusses the unchanged share of manufacturing output in real GNP but argues that a declining share of nominal spending on manufactured products is more relevant. He cites a Congressional Budget Office view that supports this. But, ot course, the declining share of nominal spending reflects the difference in these two measures, the continuing historical decline in the price of U.S. manufactured products relative to output prices generally. The latter is correctly regarded to be a sign of the strength of the growth of productivity and output in this sector, to 1982, when real income growth declined, this share fell sharply. Front '1982 to 1984, when real income gr'ew r-apidly, it rose. The recent slow growth in manufacturing output, which appear's to be concentr-ated in) 1984-85 and earlier' in 1980-82. is not sun'prising in light of the relatively slow growth in r'eal GNP over' the same periods. Moreover, the share of manufacturing output in n-eat GNP has n-emained steady recently and does not appear' low t-elative to the previous experience?
The casual evidence above indicates that the answer to this question is no. the questioti can also be 'From 1/1948 to Ill/i 980, the average level of the share of manufacturing output in real GNP was 21.4 percent, while the average level of the Federal Reserve index of capacity utilization, a measure of the cycle, was 82.8 percent. Over the period Ill/i 984 to lV/1985, the utilization rate was somewhat lower, averaging 80.6 percent, but the share of manufacturing output was higher, averaging 21.9 percent.
mon'e l'igorous test should take ir'tto account the strongly cyclical tiehavior of manufacturing output gr'owth. Alter' all, in the ean'lier period, the capacity utilization r'ate was little changed at 77.0 percent 11/1976) and 77.1 per-cent Ill t/1980), while in the more r'ecent period it rose slightly to 80.5 percent 1/1985). Such a cyclical improvement con.nld lie expected to raise manufactur'ing output gn-owth in the n'ecent penod relative to the ear-lien' l.ieriod.
To assess the exchange rate hypothesis, the relationship between mann~rfactun'ingoutput gr'owth arid n'eal GNP was fin'st established for' the period fr-om llt/1947 to 111/1980. i'his relationship is: 1) 400~lnXM,= -4128 + t.745 400MnX/ -5.60) ) 13.40) 'A search of the lagged relationship between XM and X up to four past quarters was conducted. Only one past value is significant for real GNP. Virtually the same results are obtained using quarterly industrial production growth on the left-hand-side of equations 1 and 2. The fact that XM is a component of X cannot influence the results here. To verify this, the results in this section were examined using compounded annual rates of change and decomposing real income growth into the lagged share of manufacturing output in real GNP times the growth rate of manufacturing output and a corresponding product for nonmanufacturing output. This allows the removal of the current period's manufacturing output growth from the right-handside of equation 1. The hypothesis that the effect of weighted past growth in manufacturing or nonmanufacturing output is the same could not be rejected and none ot the results reported here were affected. when-c XM is manufactur-ing output and X, is real GNP in) quar'ter' t; growth r-ates an'e measur-ed as 400 times the diffen-erce in the logar-ithru of the output senies, which provides continuously compounded gr-owth rates.' The standard en-or (SEt, Th arid tjun-bin-Watson past five year-s than the prror cyclical r-elationsiup would predict. Oven' the r-ecent period of weak mariufacturing growth, Itl/1984-tV/1985, when it aver-aged only a 1.5 percent rate, the predicted gn-owth rate based on n'eal GNP growth alone was about zero. Thus, even Over' this pen-iod , manufacturing riutp ut was relativelv sti-ong.'
To lest the exchange n-ate hypothesis, the growth r-ate of the exchange value rif the dollar (400~lnEX,rwas added to the equation. 'The exchange n-ate hypothesis indicates that, given GNP growth, art appreciation of the dollar should weaketi manufacturing output growth the coefficient should be negative.
When the full period fioni ttl/1947 to tV/1985 is used, the results ar-c significantly counter to the exchange rate hypothesis. 'i'he estimate is:
(2) 400MnxM = -2.95 + 1.52 400AInX,i Only the exchange i-ate thn-ee quar-ter-s earlier-exhibits any significant relationship with manufacturing output. so other' lags have been omitted. Equation 2 indicates that ther-e is a positive, not a negative, nelationship between the exchange value of the dollar ard manufactut-ing output)' Thus, the strength of the cxchange i-ate over-the past live year's has been associated with a significant lioost in manufacturing output growth. Apparently, the appreciation of the dollar has been associated with economic developments that wei-e expected to i-aise U.S. productivity. While equation 2 n'ehites the exchange n-ate hypothesis, the positive r-elationship between tire exchange rate and manufacturing output warn-ants mon-e explanation.
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The exchange rate hypothesis is based on the link between tile exchange n-ate and relative demands for prodticts. But, over the past five yeans, the exchange n-ate has moved opposite to that expected based on demand conditions in goods markets alone.
'['he exchange rate, like any pr-ice, is deter-mined by supply and demand. Focusing initially only on the use of the dollar to facilitate inter-national goods transactions, the demand fora flow of dollar-s in international exchange depends on the dollar' value of for-eign deniand foi 11.5. goods. Given other factor-s that influence this demand, tile quantity demanded vanies inversely with the value of the dollar. When the foreign currency pr-ice of the dollar' rises, U.S. goods tiecome mor-e expensive to foreigners and they r-educe their pun--chases; thus, the quantity of dollar-s demanded to pay for-our expon-ts falls.
Sin ilarly, a rise in the exchange value of the dollar n-educes the dollar' pt-ices of goods imported from abroad. This pr-()mpts r-esidetlts to buy tnore for-eign goods on-increase imports. Thus, tile quantity of do!-tars supplied to pay for-increased U.S. imports would rise with the exchange n-ate.
4 Equilibrium occurs
' Solomon (1985) and Lawrence have noted the strength ot U.S. industrial production growth in the early 1 980s, based on the annual relationship of such growth to the growth rate of real GNP from 1951 to 1981. '°Asearch of up to four lags of the exchange rate movement was conducted. The same test was done using the real exchange rate, but the results are nearly identical since movements in the nominal and real exchange rate have been about the same.
"It is conceivable that a rise in the exchange rate has its dominant impact on real income, and that manufacturing adjusts in line with equation 1. But such a result is at odds with the notion that exchange rate movements have a disproportionate effect on manufacturing, beyond those associated with any induced cyclical movements in U.S. real income. This possibility is also at odds with the paucity of evidence supporting the hypothesis that exchange rate movements affect real GNP. The ambiguity of the evidence on this issue has been noted by Anderson (1985) -A simple test of the hypothesis is to regress the growth rate of real GNP on current and past changes in the exchange rate and a constant over the period when the exchange rate changes, l/1967-IV/1985. There are no significant exchange rate effects in such an investigation for up to four lagged values of exchange rate movements, even when they are entered separately or in groups of up to five terms. "The positive relationship between U.S. manufacturing output and the exchange rate is not a recent development. For the 1947-80 period, the estimate in equation 2 is virtually the same as that shown for the longer period, and the exchange rate coefficient and lag structure is the same and similarly significant. Tests ot whether the coefficients in equations 1 or 2 changed after exchange rates began to move more freely in 1/1973 indicated that there were no such changes. Of course, other factors, such as protectionist changes in U.S. trade policy like voluntary export restraint agreements on Japanese autos, may have contributed to the recent strength of U.S. manufacturing, but in the aggregate data, this is not apparent. "An in-sample experiment using equation 1 shows the other side of this relationship. Most of the previous decline in the trade-weighted value of the dollar occurred from ll/1976 to 11/1978. During this period, U.S. real income experienced a strong cyclical recovery, rising at a continuous rate of 4,9 percent. Using equation 1, the predicted growth rate in manufacturing output is 11 percent, but such growth was only 6.9 percent over the period.
"This requires that the increased volume of purchases more than offsets the decline in the dollar price of imported foreign goods.
where the supply and demand for dollars in the foreign exchange market are equal at some level of the exchange i-ate.
The dotlai rises in value only if the demand for dollars rises or the supply of dollars falls. But these shifts con-espond to a rise in exports or-a fall in U.S. imports. Since 1980, however, real exports generally have fallen while real imports have nsen. Thus, movements in n-dative demands for' U.S. goods appear-to have little to do with exchange i-ate developments since 1980. The demand for U.S. and foreign goods and conesponding demand and supply of dollar-s in for-eign exchange mar-kets an-c inadequate explanations of recent developments. Mon-c than goods and services at-c traded among nalions. tJ.S.r-esidents also acquir-e real and financial assets abroad, supplying dollars in inter'-national exchange; likewise, foreigner-s acquire U.S. real and fitiancial assets, demanding dollar-s in international exchange mar-kets to facilitate the exchange When there is a shift in the demand and/or-supply of dollams due to strch investment flows, the exchange i-ate can also chatige. 1'hus, a r-ise in the value of the dollar in inlernational exchange can occur' either-because of an increase in for-eign investment iii the tinited States (ii' because of a reduction in U.S. investmerit abr-oad. Most analyses of foreigri exchange developments emphasize the former-." The latter-, however-, has been the dominant for-ce in the 1980s" Table 2 Real gross domestic product where mndncated linited Stales relative to that in the nest of the won-Id Second, hr addition to the n-eduction of output gro~vth abr'oad due to a relative capacity loss, cyclical l'on'res contnilinted to a loss itt output and income growth abroad 3' As a m'esnl t, foi-eign demand and consn nit tiont of goods expom-ted and inn pon-ted liv the United States fell n-elatiye to U.S. do rnestic dennand, depm-essing world hr-ices of tn'aded goods. Table 3 shows the growth i-ates of neal UN P in t 2 countries during the period of dollar' depreciation. 1976-80, and dun'ing 1980-84, when the dollar' appreci-"The decline in the cost of capital relative to that abroad was not the only factor accounting for differential capacity growth. See below. There is considerable disagreement among analysts concerning the effects of taxes on the cost of capital and investment, Many argue that 1982 tax changes repealed the 1981 investment incentives. Bosworth (1985) and Slemrod (1986) present the view that investment was not boosted by tax law changes. Meyer (1984) argues that the net cost of capital was lowered on average. He also notes areas where it was raised. Two of the strongest areas of investment, business automobiles and commercial and industrial buildings, are areas where Meyer shows the largest reduction in the net cost of capital. Also, see Tatom (1985) . "The monetary approach to the balance of payments emphasizes relative money stock and real income growth. See Kemp (1975) . for example. He shows that, in the monetary approach, an appreciation of the exchange rate occurs when domestic money stock growth slows, or when domestic real income growth accelerates relative to that in the rest of the world.
ated, In the ear-her period, U.S -real UN P growth was exceeded in Japat'i. Norway, Italy amid the Nethen-landsOven' the later' pen-iod. all of the count m-ies except Japa it showed slower gn-owth I ban the United States. NIore rmnpon-tant, the gr-owth n-ate slowed in 1980-84 n-c Iatively more than in the Uttited States in every count rv but the United Kingdont, Dentntiam'k and Sweden, where real output growth was slttggish in both periods. Unemployment developntertts show the same relatively poor-perlor-rnance in oIlier co untr-ies -The am-ca encompassing the Eum-opeant member-s of the On-gantization for' Economic Cooper-anion arid tievelopment 26 countriesl showed an increase iii unemployrner'rt fr-ont 6.1 per-cern of the labor' force in 1980 tnt 10.7 per-ccitt in 1984. Over the ear-lien' period, unemployment rose less. t.np from 5.4 pen-cent in 1976. In Canada, the unernplovrnertt n-ate rose fnont 7.1 pen-cent itt 1976 to 7.4 pen-cent itt 1980, then to 11.3 pert:ent in 1984. In Japan, the unemployment n-ate was the same in) 1980 as in 1976, at 2 pen-ccitt of the lalior Ion-ce, then r-ose to 2.7 percent in 1984. In contn-ast, the une mplovment tate in the United States jell from 7.6~ie 'ce nit itt 1976 to 7.0 percent itt 1980. From 1980 to 1984, I he rale rose 0.5 percentage points, a smaller-mci-ease than itt the 26 countries of OECD-Enn-opc, Canada or Japan.'' Another way to see whether for-c ign exchange developnttentts have weakened U.S. manufactuning is tn examine trends itt mart ufactu mn rig i it other cottnt lies frorti 1976 to 1980, when the exchange value of the dollar generally fell an-nil fn-om 1980 to 1984. when it rose Accon-dirtg to the exchange rate argument, if U.S. production was weakened by the rise in the exchange n-ate, for-eign nun Ii otis wotill be cx l.iected to have had stronger manufacturing output growth (Inc to their falling exchange m-ate.
As table 4 shows. the gr-o~~'tlt n-ate of U.S. rnanufactun--ing output from 1980 to 1984 was second only to that "The dominance of the improvement in the relative growth of the U.S. economy in accounting for the rise in the value in the dollar is reinforced by the fact that between 1976-80 and 1980-85, the growth rate of Ml accelerated in the United States, but slowed in all the other countries shown in table 3. Such monetarytrends would be expected to lower the value of the dollar against these other currencres. "The latest year for which the data used is available for all the countries examined is 1984. The data on manufacturing in Only Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom show a negative r'elat ionship between changes in tlte value of the coon try's cur-n-encv and the growt hr-ate of its manufacturing sector. The evidemtce is riot itttended to show that ant appn-ecia timtg c Ui-temtcv is always associated with relatively stromtg manufact mining growth, since such a comici usion is as questionable as "It might be objected that the countries examined in the tIme comt trary view. But this has beent the case for-nine of 12 countries imt the 1 980s, and them-c is little evidence that U.S -manufacturi mng output was weakened or' that it lost out to fon'eign contpetitor-s.
A key par-t of the international explanation of mamtt,mfactoring output growth in thin) UnIted States is that the. comttpetitive position of this sector worsened due to foreign competition aminl the strength nif the dollar. A look at the data (in factor costs and productivity, however-, does riot r-eveal a deter-iorationt itt L.J .S. cornpetitivenessThe impm-oved expected real cash flow available to business following the 1981 lax act led to amt increase in domestic investment nlennartnl." Of co m n-se, relatively s tron tge r in\'es t muemit in cr-eases financing (Iemands, m'aisintg the real n-ate of n-etnm-mm (in) financial iristrunients including stocks, bonds and shom't-ter-mni nlebt. lInt for-eigr'r pm-oducer-s did riot gain from acceletated cost m'ecovery, lowem-corpon-ate utcome tax rates or' the cx tension of the invest men t tax cm-edit mt the United States -Inst cad, they simply had to adj mist to the higher real rates of ret urn r'eqtr mid on fimtancma I inst rn men ts ant I rtal assets in) the won-hI capital mitarket -'Fhr.rs, the in ten-nat iotial competitivertess of t ,5~industry gener-allv improved. Sweden 2.0 -0.5 2.5 -7.7 '-'2.1 -5.6 United Kingdom 0.2 '-1.7 1.9 -4.9 2.9 --7.8
Manufacturing Output Growth
"The strength of U.S. domestic saving and investment is discussed in Tatom (1985) . Another key finctor in(lnencintg routpar-ative cnists is the cost of labor per unit (if outpnt. 'I'ahle 5 cornpa res manufacturing (mit labor cost acm'oss conritn-nes. In the limst colun in, the male of incm-ease itt mmmii labor cost is shown for-the per-ionl of dollar' appreciation fr-nm 1980 to t984. The r-ate of increase mt unIt labor-cnist is not the slowest itt the UmI ted States, t bough it is well below tIre rate mt nnaniy of I lie con nit mies showntnt the secottd arid third col (mumis, tlie tate of incretse in trnit labor' cost over the Iien-uid of dol lam' depm-eciatiom I, 197(5-80, and the di fl'em'ences between tIne two periods an-c shown. fri the 1976-80 liem'iod , the pace of m nit labor cost increase in the t rtit cdl States was amuong the hightest shown -Them-c is a whIc gap between the slowing in the United Stales and that in the othen' JO counttries shown. iltn 5, ti-ends in tm it niannufacturing mmnpn'oved over the recent four~'ears.
-A niajom lacton' accounting for' the impm-overtien t in) until labor cost is a relative inn pm-ovement inn productivity gm'owth inn ntanufacturmmtg. While U.S. niantufactur-ing pt-oductivitv gr-niwth from 1980 to t984 was about avet-age conti par-ed with t lit nit hem' con nt ries, it improved sharply from thin) t 976-80 period, when it was much lower-thiant in) 10 of the other' t I eountm-ies shown in table 5, Table 5 also indicates m-eal wage developmerits over thie two pem-iods." Real wage movement ts reflect changes in supply and demand. Thnns,am-ise in real wages cati occu m' due to cit her a imtcr'ease inn the emand fom' labor-or-a m-ise imi the supply price of labor', or some comhinnation thereof. In the former case, employment tends to r-ise, while in the latten' case emplovment tennis to fall. Thus, evidence nm meal wages alone does riot indicate whether demantd, supply or both am-c c.hatgi rig.
The implication of thie internationiah explaniation, however-, is that, by shifting the demanid fon' ntanufactur-ing output away from the Uniteni Slates towam-d toreigni competitom's, the niennand fnir faliot-atir'oad would ntse and that in the t,Jnited States would fall. As a result, n-cal wages imi the UnIted States woulnh tend tni decline n-dative to those in nither-counitrmes. Real wage gr-owth in the Uniited States was higher inn 1980-84 than it was in the ear-lien' pen-iod~however. i'his inipr-ovewent was larger' itt the t!nited States than in ahl the other-countries except Italy. Indeed, mi eight of the other nations real wage gr-owth fell between the two pen'nods.
't'he gro%vthi nif manufacturing employuncut itt the 12 coumitmies is shoi-vni at the end nif table 5, It, too, is at odds with the view that manufacturing out put and ennp loynnen t art beitig red is trihi tmted away from the United States. While the I able i t)dI cates that U.S. mart rmlacttnm'inig employment declined fn-o mu 1980 to 1984, tbne decline compares favor-alihv to developnnents in) the other 11 countries. Only Japan amid Dennian-k showeni ant increase in emplniynrnent over the t980-84 perinmd±
The decline in employment gr-owth in the United States oven' the two pnnm-idinls is among the largest in the table. As tahile 4 intdicates, however-, fIt is dccl inc was n-nit due to n-educed output gt-owth. Instead, the dieclinic r-eflects the r-elatively 5 tmong pace of pnonluctivit gr-ow-tbi in rtatiufactnmirig diver-the n-ecent pet-ionlThe use of annmnral r-ates of gr-owth choes riot fully illuminiate the clmanitatnc diffen'ences that have occur-n-ed in manufacturing employment itcross the counttries. Oven-the full peniod it table 5, only Japan and the United States showed gr-owth in ntanufactun'-ing employment, hut it was up less than 5 percemmt in each case 12.7 and! 4.9 per-ceril, respectively; after eight 27 Fieleke (1985) has shown that there is no correlation between the growth of import penetration in various U.S. industries and their employment growth over the 1980-84 period. McKenzie and Smith (1986) find that textile imports in the early 1980s and in the period 1960-84 had no significant negative effect on employment in the U.S. textile and apparel industries. They do find some evidence that apparel imports have affected employment in the apparel industry. They find that the dominant factor influencing employment in these industries has been relatively rapid productivity growth in both industries.
years. Itt Canada and Dent mark, such eruploymnemi I fell ahiout I per-cent oven-the eight year-s. Inn Fm-ance, Gem--many, Italy, Non-way and Sweden, the rechuctioni was ahniut 9 to 15 pel'cdrit . In the Nether-lands, Belgium and the United Kingdlon'n such employment fell liv 21) to 24 pen-cent. tf then-c is a n-edistn-ihntion of employment going on, it appear-s to be stn-onglv in favor of the UnIted States and Japan. Finally, energy prices are another cost of production that has moved clown in the United States cnmntpan-edl with such pnces ahn-oad. Itt the United States, ener~v pr-ices have declined relative lo the prices of business output. This is itt sharp contrast to dlevelopments ahn-oad. Since oil is a major sour-ce of enen-gv at-ound the won-Id and dither soun-ces of enen-gy compete with it, a Inmok at the real pm-ice of oil in various conritn-ies is sufficient. Table 6 shows the 1980-84 change in the m'eal cost of oil to domestic and foreign prodkncers,2While this pt-ice fell at a 5.2 Iierce.nt mate fi-nim 1980 to 1984 in the Unitedi States, it genet'ally rose ahiroad, Only Japan shows a decline like that in the United States. In Italy arid Norway, such pr-ints were ne.am-ly unchanged, but itt the other eight eonnitm-ies shon,vn, the price nif oil rose sharply n-dative to prices nif goods and services genen-allv.
'I'hius, it is dlitfi ,ult to argue I hat I lie in) ten-national competit ivetiess nif U.S. industtv has hieett hurt by tine rise in thie value nmf the doilan-from 1980-85. t-'or capital and enen-gv resources, it appear-s that factor pr-ices have not tisen m-elative tn) cm utp tnt him-ices in the [ J nited States, especially when cornpat'ed with the expem'ience of fon'eigni competitnmn-s. For labor-, it does not appear that n-cal wages in the United States have been depressed n-dative to those abnoad. 'llie positive relationship between the gm-myth oftJ,S. mantufacttrrinig output alidi the rise in the exchange value of the dollar' appam--ently reflects impm-oved competitiveness of U.S. mannfactun-ing.
2SThe dollar price of imported oil in the United States is representative of the world price since oil is priced in dollars around the world and, except for differences in taxes and transportation costs, the U.S. price is representative of the price for firms in other nations. The local currency price of oil is assumed to be the average cost of imported oil in the United States (dollars per barrel) multiplied by the exchange rate between the local currency and the dollar (foreign currency/dollar). For Canada, the industry selling price for petroleum and coal products is used instead of the price of imported oil, The industry selling price for petroleum refineries shows the same annual rate of increase. Canada, like the U.S. in 1980, had significant regulations on domestic oil and energy prices, so that the imported price of oil is not representative of local costs. In the U.S. case, the average cost of oil to domestic refiners is used to measure the dollar price of Oil. These local prices of oil are deflated by the consumer price index foraach country to examine movements in the real cost of oil in the various countries. 
SiUN
Manufactun-ing output in the United States does not appear to have been adversely affected by exchange rate developments since 1980. Except for-the cclical decline associated with the 1980 and 1981-82 mecessions, manufactuning output has maintained its share in real GNP and has shown faithy rapid growth. Indeed, the evidence indicates that, during the 1980s, suchi output has gm-own 2.0 percentage points fasten-than the 1948-SQ relationship of such output to n-eah income would predict. Of course, since manufacturing pt-oduction rose wiule exports fell and imports m-ose, U.S. purchases of such goods nose rapidly. It) effect, U.S. consumption was naised not only due to increased pn-ocluction, but also hy pun-chasing U.S. pn-odtmcts that formerly wen-e expotted and lon-eign pmodiucts that fornietly wen-e put'chased abroad.
No doubt the nise in the value of the dollar' n-cstrained the gn-owthi of demanni for-U.S.-manufactur-ed pn-oducts. But the appreciation of the dohhar in pam-t simply offset in pnovenienits in the r-ehative cnist advamitages of IfS. pn-oducen-s oven' fon-eign competitors. In industries in which these cnist advatitages wem-e unusually stn-ong on' weak, the gains in prodhuction and employment wen-e relatively stn-onger or weaken-than the data for' the whole nnarunfactw-ing secton-indicate. 'l'hus, there am-e likely to lie industries in whiichi the misc in the exchange value of the dollar' bias exerted stm-ong negative inilluences nmni pm-oduction, prices antI employment that wem-e not offset by relative cost innpmovernents 5'
Manufactum-ing output gn-owth abn'oad has not
shown the expected gains that would occut-if the exchange mate alone were realhocating won-Id demand and production of such goods. Duming the period of dollar appreciation, production growth showed sham-ply in most other-countries. These dlevelopnients reflect a m-edistn'ihution of capital and output toward the United States and away ft-om othem countn-ies. The evidence suggests that this redistribution and the appreciation of the dollar n-eflect the m'elative cost improvements in U.S. pn-oduction.
'I'he irony, then, is that the new-found conventional wisdom, which holds that the n'ise in the dollar bias weakened the competitive position of U.S. tnanufactun-ing, not only appean-s to be incon-n'ect, hut it reverses the dominant positive n-elationship and it obscures the m-ecent strength of U.S. manufactun-ing. Adjustedl for normal cyclical movements in the United States, manufacturing output bias been nelatively strong in the 1980s; thus is in lan-ge part n-elated to the innpm-nivements in the competitiveness and n-cal tate of n-etun-n in U.S. manufacturing and!, hence, the appreciation in the value of the dollar in the eanly 1980s. Nonetheless, the inten-natiotial explanation has led to calls fon-pnotectionist and! monetary andl fiscal actions to drive the exchange value of the dollan' down. Such actions am-c likely to m-etan-d the otherwise impn-oving connpetitiven'ness of U.S. manufactum-ing.
At least in the United States, exchange n-ate movements ovem the eight yeats from 1976 to 1984 appear-to n-eflect policy-induced and other changes in U.S. internaticmnah competitiveness. 'l'hus, economic policies that promote boiv inflation and fastet' or mon-c stable gr-owth appear-to lie n-elatively mom-c iniportant for tJ.S. manufacturing than the exchange n-ate consequences of economic policy or other exchange n-ate developments.
'~Output growth rates in the 10 industries in manufacturing industrial production indicate that three -transportation equipment (especially motor vehicles and parts), lumber and products, and printing and publishing -showed faster than average growth in 1980-84 and their growth rate was higher than it had been in 1976-80. The only sector where growth in 1980-84 was below average and slower than in 1976-80 was fabricated metal products. Other industries (primary metals, apparel and products, chemicals and products, foods, electrical, and non-electrical machinery) showed mixed results on these criteria. For example, the two machinery industries showed the largest declines in 1980-84 from growth in the earlier period, but their growth exceeded the average for all 10 industries over the recent period.
